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Since the end of World War II, trade pol-
icy around the world has been characterized
by a tendency toward greater liberalization.
Among developed countries, almost all re-
ductions in import tariffs and relaxation
of quantitative restrictions have been ne-
gotiated under multilateral, preferential, or
bilataral trade agreements. Countries en-
gaged in these negotiations have sought to
reduce trade barriers relative to the existing
level of protection – the threat point in the
event of a breakdown in negotiations has
generally been a continuation of the status
quo.
The last several years have seen a rever-
sal of that trend. Beginning in 2016 with
the British referendum to exit the the Euro-
pean Union, a number of countries around
the world have engaged in renegotiating
their exisiting trade relationships. Con-
crete examples include the UK-EU nego-
tiations over a post-Brexit trade relation-
ship, the US-Mexico-Canada renegotiation
of a free trade agreement (FTA) in North
America, the renegotiation of the Korea-
US FTA, and in the midst of a multi-year
trade war between the US and China, ef-
forts throughout 2019 to negotiate a hia-
tus in the scheduled escalation of the trade
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war. What makes these negotiations differ-
ent from previous endeavours is that tariff
increases rather than the status quo have
loomed as the fallback position if trade talks
fail.
In this paper, we examine how the loom-
ing threat of tariff hikes under a trade
agreement renegotiation impacts firm entry
into a trading partner’s market. We use
the June 2016 Brexit vote as a natural ex-
periment to study how the threat of tariff
hikes impacts British firms. Following the
referendum vote, the UK announced its in-
tention to renegotiate its trade deal with
the European Union.1 Because both the
UK and EU are members of the WTO, the
extent of tariff increases that British firms
would face if negotiations were to break
down is defined by the EU’s trade policy
schedule at the WTO. The EU’s import tar-
iff rates under the WTO exhibit consider-
able variation across products. For a num-
ber of products, the EU imposes no import
duties; thus UK firms would face no import
tariffs in the EU even if the UK left the EU
with no trade deal. However, a substan-
tial share of the UK’s trade with the EU
would face non-zero import tariffs if Britain
were to depart the EU without a trade deal.
We examine how the sensitivity of British
exporters to threatened tariff rates evolves
over time using monthly data on entry into
the EU market by British firms at the prod-
uct level between February 2012 and De-
cember 2016. We find that the sensitivity
of British firm entry at the product level
1At the time of writing, in November 2019, the EU
and UK are working on two distinct trade agreements.
One is an interim, transitional agreement to govern UK-
EU trade for a fixed duration after Britain’s withdrawal
from the EU. The second is a permanent agreement to
govern trade after the end of a transition period. An
important risk for British firms since June 2016 has been
the possibility that the UK would leave the EU without
an interim withdrawal trade agreement.
1
2to ‘no-deal’ tariff rates increased steadily
in the six months after the British vote to
leave the EU. The looming threat of tariff
hikes deterred entry modestly in the first
month after the referendum, but the de-
terrent effect grew over time; presumably
this increased sensitivity reflected firms’ be-
liefs about the likelihood that UK-EU trade
talks would break down without a deal to
ensure the continuity of duty-free market
access.
The importance of multilateral and pref-
erential trade agreements in facilitating
greater trade is documented in a large liter-
ature.2 More recently, the theoretical and
empirical literature has emphasized that
trade agreements increase trade between
signatories not only by lowering tariffs but
also by reducing uncertainty over future
tariff schedules (Lima˜o and Maggi (2015),
Handley and Lima˜o (2015), Pierce and
Schott (2016), Handley and Lima˜o (2017),
and Crowley, Meng and Song (2018)).
Crowley, Exton and Han (2018) provide
the first empirical evidence documenting
the firm response to increased uncertainty
from renegotiation of an agreement between
freely trading partners while Handley and
Lima˜o (2018) examine how fluctuations in
the likelihood of Brexit impacted UK-EU
trade prior to the referendum in June 2016.
In this paper, we explore the monthly evo-
lution of the responsiveness of firm-product
entry to the threat of tariff increases arising
from the June 2016 Brexit vote.
I. Data
The empirical analysis is conducted on a
confidential microdataset of the universe of
EU transactions from Her Majesty’s Rev-
enue and Customs (HMRC) Overseas Trade
Statistics (2017) which incorporates tar-
iff data at the HS08 digit level from the
WTO’s Tariff Analysis Online (2018).
2Lima˜o (2016) summarizes the literature for PTAs.
Important contributions include Baier and Bergstrand
(2007); Subramanian and Wei (2007); and Egger et al.
(2011).
A. UK customs data
Our analysis uses the HMRC Overseas
Trade Statistics EU Dispatches dataset.
The EU dispatches data includes monthly
records of export value and quantity for UK
firms by CN08 product and destination for
those firms whose exports to the EU ex-
ceed £250,000 in a given year.3 We ensure
a consistent concordance across the CN08
products over time following Van Beveren,
Bernard and Vandenbussche (2012).
The focus of our analysis is entry of
British firms into the EU over the two and
a half years before and six months after the
Brexit referendum. For each month and
CN08 product category between February
2012 and December 2016, we calculate the
number of UK firms entering the EU. An
entry into the EU occurs if a firm f with
a product h has a positive value of exports
in month m to any country in the EU and
the firm did not export the same product
h to the EU in the previous twelve months,
m−1 to m−12. Next, for each month from
January 2013 to December 2016, we cumu-
late the number of entrants in that month
with those of the previous eleven months.
This gives us an annual number of entrants
into the EU for a rolling twelve month win-
dow over four years. With this measure,
we can examine how annual entry evolves
month by month in response to changes
in firms’ expectations about the likelihood
that Britain would leave the EU without a
trade deal ensuring continued duty-free ac-
cess. For concreteness, the cumulated num-
ber of British firm-product entrants into the
EU over the twelve month window between
July 2015 and June 2016 was 109,317. Our
analysis explores how this number evolved
over time in response to the threat of ‘no-
deal’ tariff hikes.
3The requirement to report exports at the detailed
product level applies to firms whose total value of ex-
ports exceeds the Intrastat reporting threshold. Since
2009 the nominal value of the threshold for dispatches
has remained fixed at £250,000 and therefore is constant
over the time period of the analysis in this paper.
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B. Threatened tariff hikes
The threat point tariffs facing British
firms in each CN08 product category come
from the EU’s WTO tariff schedule. In ad-
dition to an analysis of entry in response
to the product’s tariff rate, we create a
set of discrete measures of threatened trade
policy restrictiveness based upon the level
of the WTO tariffs. Products facing a
zero ad valorem tariff are the default cat-
egory; products facing tariff rates greater
than zero, but less than or equal to 5
percent are categorized as ‘low’ restrictive-
ness; products facing tariffs greater than 5
but less than or equal to 10 percent face
‘medium’ restrictiveness; products facing
tariff greater than 10 but less than or equal
to 15 percent face ‘high’ restrictiveness; and
products facing tariffs greater than 15 per-
cent fall into the ‘extreme’ category.
II. Empirical analysis
We estimate the responsiveness of the
growth of British firm entry at the CN08
product level from January 2014 though
December 2016 using a flexible linear re-
gression with a full set of monthly time
dummies and an interaction between these
time dummies and product-level tariff
threats.
∆Yhm,t = αm,t + βm,t ∗ τh + ηhm,t(1)
The dependent variable, ∆Yhm,t is the
growth rate of new British entrants into
the EU over a one year period ending
in month m of year t for each of the
8040 CN08 product categories subject to
an ad valorem import tariff.4 We fol-
low Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) in cal-
culating growth: ∆Yhm,t = 2(Yhm,t −
Yhm,t−1)/(Yhm,t + Yhm,t−1).
The threat point tariff taken from the
EU’s WTO tariff schedule is given by τh.
The elasticity of the growth of entry with
4We omit product categories subject to quotas, tar-
iff rate quotas, and specific duties and refer the reader
to Crowley, Exton and Han (2018) for analyses that in-
cludes these products.
respect to the tariff, βm,t, is estimated in
each month of the sample. Evolution of this
elasticity captures how much entry of goods
under the threat of tariff hikes changes rel-
ative to goods that would face zero tariffs
under a breakdown in trade agreement ne-
gotiations. We also estimate the respon-
siveness of entry growth for different cat-
egories of threatened trade policy restric-
tiveness relative to that for products facing
zero ad valorem tariffs under all renegotia-
tion outcomes.
III. Evolution of entry responsiveness
Figure 1 graphs the evolution of the
responsiveness of entry growth to tariff
threats, i.e., the coefficients βm,t from equa-
tion (1). The dashed grey lines bound the
95 percent confidence interval for each es-
timated coefficient. In the two and a half
years leading up to the Brexit vote, i.e., the
pre-treatment period before the renegotia-
tion of the UK-EU trade deal began (Jan-
uary 2014 through May 2016), the respon-
siveness of entry to the EU’s WTO tariffs
fluctuated around zero. In some months,
entry growth for products that would never
face an import duty in the EU was higher
than for other products and in other months
it was lower than that for other products.
However, from June 2016, we see that elas-
ticity of entry for products subject to the
threat of a tariff increase fell below zero and
that the magnitude of the tariff coefficient
continued to increase while remaining nega-
tive. As the months rolled forward, British
firms became increasingly sensitive to the
risk of a no deal Brexit suggesting that their
beliefs that negotiations could break with-
out an agreement to ensure duty-free mar-
ket access were increasing over this period.
To better understand if the estimated en-
try responsiveness is driven by products
facing higher versus lower tariffs under a
breakdown in negotiations, in figure 2 we
graph the evolution of entry responsive-
ness to dummy variables that represent dis-
crete categories of trade policy restrictive-
ness (i.e., the evolution of the estimated
βm,t for each categorical variable of trade
restrictiveness). With products that face
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Note: Figure 1 graphs the estimated values and 95
percent confidence intervals of βm,t from equation (1).
Figure 2 graphs the estimated values of βm,t for each
of four discrete tariff categories.
Source: HMRC administrative data.
zero tariffs under a breakdown in negoti-
ations as the omitted category, each line
depicts the responsiveness of the growth of
entry relative to products which face no un-
certainty about future tariff rates. The gen-
eral pattern observed in figure 1 is consis-
tent with the responsiveness for products at
risk of high, medium, and low tariffs in the
future. Over 2014 and 2015, the respon-
siveness hovers around zero. However, in
the months after the Brexit vote of June
2016, there is a clear pattern in which the
growth of product entry by firms turns neg-
ative and becomes more sensitive to possi-
ble future tariffs over time. Products facing
extremely high tariffs under a failure of the
renegotiation show entry growth which is
volatile prior to the Brexit vote, but nega-
tive and increasingly sensitive to tariffs in
the second half of 2016.
IV. Counterfactual estimates of entry
We use the estimates of entry responsive-
ness to tariffs displayed in figure 1 to coun-
terfactually estimate the extent of ‘missing
entry’ due to the looming threat of tar-
iffs from July 2016 through December 2016.
For this exercise, we apply the estimated
tariff coefficients for each month, and the
threatened tariffs for each of the 8062 prod-
ucts in our dataset to a base value for the
actual number of new products introduced
into the EU by British firms. This yields
the change in the number of entrants in
each product category relative to the base
period. Aggregating these changes over all
products in each period gives us the to-
tal number of missing entrants at the firm-
product level in that period. We base our
counterfactual estimates on the number of
entrants between July 2015 and June 2016:
109,317. As we start with an annualized
number of entrants for June 2016, figure 3
presents the annualized change in the num-
ber of entrants due to increased sensitivity
to the threat of tariff hikes for each month,
July 2016 through December 2016. Inter-
estingly, although the number of missing
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Figure 3. Counterfactual decline in accumulated
firm-product entry
Note: Negative values on the y-axis indicate the
annualized number of ‘missing’ firm-product entrants
relative to a counterfactual of no risk of tariff increases
under a failure of trade negotiations.
Source: Authors’ calculations using estimates from
equation (1) and HMRC administrative data.
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entrants associated with the risk of future
tariff increases was relatively modest (803)
in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit
vote, the number of missing entrants in-
creased substantially over time. By De-
cember of 2016, 4678 firm-products were
missing. Possible explanations for this in-
clude increased saliency of the question of
the future trade relationship with the EU to
British firms as well as revised beliefs about
the likelihood that Britain would leave the
EU without a deal to guarantee continued
duty-free market access.
V. Conclusion
When the renegotiation of a trade agree-
ment takes place under the threat that tar-
iffs will increase if negotiations fail, firm en-
try into a trading partner’s market declines.
Empirically, we find that uncertainty over
future market access following the Brexit
referendum of June 2016 deterred British
firms from introducing products into the
EU. More generally, our findings suggest
that trade agreements have dynamic trade-
promoting effects – by establishing stable
tariff rates for the future, trade agreements
reduce one source of risk for firms that
would like to expand internationally.
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